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Explaining the Decline in American 
Fertility in the Nineteenth Century 
Jenny Bourne Wahl 
The economic transformation  [that accompanied the industrial revolution] 
coincided with-and  in part caused-a  change in the quality of  family life 
as well as the quantity of  children. As the family became less an economic 
unit  it  ripened  into a covenant  of  love and nurturance  of  children.  . . . 
Families became more child-centered. . . . And as parents lavished more 
love on their children, they had fewer of  them and devoted more resources 
to [them]. . . . This helps explain the . . . decline of the birth rate . . . in 
the nineteenth century. 
James McPherson, Battle Cry of  Freedom‘ 
The fertility of Americans fell throughout  the nineteenth century, beginning 
in  the northeastern  states. Economic historians  have  attempted  to explain 
these patterns with microeconomic  models, but they have had to rely on ag- 
gregate data, principally census records, for empirical testing. The character 
of  the available data has circumscribed  inquiry about the decline of  fertility 
and  has  limited  scholars to  speculations  rooted  in  broad  macroeconomic 
movements in land and labor markets. 
Civil War historian James McPherson suggests a different approach: fami- 
lies shrank as parents focused on the quality of home life. His comments par- 
allel a model of fertility that Gary Becker, among others, pioneered to explain 
the negative correlation between the quantity and quality of children per fam- 
ily in both cross-sectional and time-series data for the twentieth century.2 Can 
this quantity-quality  model help us understand shrinking family size in nine- 
The author acknowledges the helpful suggestions made by Claudia Goldin and Edward Wahl. 
I. James McPherson, Baffle  Cry of  Freedom (New York, 1988).  pp. 34-35. 
2. See particularly Gary Becker and H. Gregg Lewis, “On the Interaction between Quantity 
and Quality of  Children,” Journal of  Polirical Economy, 81 (Mar./Apr. 1973), pp. S279-88;  and 
Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes, “Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of  Children,” 
Journal of  Political Economy, 84 (Aug. 1976), pp. S143-62. 
Special thanks also go to  Robert Fogel, Gary Becker, and Thomas Mroz. 
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teenth-century  America? I conclude here that  it can. Decreased  infant and 
child  mortality,  more available schooling, and  the  separation of  home  and 
work  places  increased  the relative  price of  a child, encouraging  parents to 
have fewer children and to spend more on each child. Empirical testing with a 
unique, intergenerationally  linked, household-level  data set collected  from 
pre-twentieth-century  sources bolsters this conclusion.  The quantity-quality 
model, supported by microeconomic data, thus offers a fresh view on declin- 
ing fertility in the United States before 1900. 
13.1  Evidence of the Fertility Decline in America 
Demographic evidence suggests that the size of American families fell per- 
sistently after 1800. Most studies of the fertility decline rely on statistics that 
do not distinguish marital fertility changes from variations in nuptiality, mor- 
tality, and the age structure of the population.  Yasukichi Yasuba and Richard 
Easterlin, for instance, point to regional differences in the child-woman ratio 
for nineteenth-century cross-sectional data; Easterlin speculates that the fertil- 
ity decline  swept westward  across America  as the population  moved  away 
from the Atlantic coast.) Warren Thompson and P.  K. Whelpton, and Ansley 
Coale and Melvin Zelnik, establish a decrease in the period total fertility rate 
through the ~entury.~ 
In a 1986 paper, I analyzed shifts in marital fertility separately from other 
demographic  shift^.^ The major proximate determinants of decreased fertility 
before  1850 were increases over time in the proportion of  women who never 
married, in the average  marriage  age, and in the mortality  rate.6 But after 
3. The child-woman ratio is the ratio of the number of children in a given age group to every 
thousand women in a given age group. The numerator includes children ages 0 to 9 or ages 0 to 4; 
the denominator includes women ages 15 to 44, 15 to 49, 20 to 44, or 20 to 49. Easterlin further 
refines his child-woman ratio to include only the children had by  married farm wives aged 30 to 
39. See Yasukichi Yasuba, Birth Rates of  the White Population in the United States, 1800-1860 
(Baltimore, 1962);  and Richard Easterlin, “Population Change and Farm Settlement in the North- 
ern United States,” Journal ofEconomic History, 36 (Mar. 1976), pp. 45-75. 
4. The period total fertility rate is the sum of age-specific fertility rates for women alive at a 
given time multiplied by  the length of the interval over which each age-specific rate was calcu- 
lated. An age-specific fertility rate equals the number of children born to women in  a given age 
interval divided by  the number of woman-years lived during the interval. The interval length is 
usually five years. See Warren Thompson and P.  K. Whelpton, Popufation Trends in the United 
States (New York,  1933); and Ansley Coale and Melvin Zelnik, New Estimates ofFertility and 
Population in the United States (Princeton, 1963). 
5.  Jenny Wahl, “New Results on the Decline in Household Fertility in the United States from 
1750 to  1900,” in  Long-Term Factors in  American Economic Growth, Stanley Engerman and 
Robert Gallman, eds. (Chicago, 1986), pp. 391-438.  A couple’s fertility refers to their actual 
childbearing experience rather than to their potential to have children. 
6. For evidence on mortality, see also Robert Fogel, “Nutrition and the Decline in  Mortality 
Since 1700: Some Preliminary Findings,” in Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, 
Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds. (Chicago,  1986). pp. 439-556.  For a discus- 
sion of average marriage age, see Michael Haines and Barbara Anderson, “New Demographic 
History of  the Late  19th-Century United States,” Explorations  in Economic History,  25 (Oct. 
1988), pp. 341-65.  For additional evidence on declining marital fertility and increasing marriage 
ages during this period, see Warren Sanderson, “New Interpretations of the Decline in the Fertility 
of White Women in the United States, 1800-1920’  (manuscript, Stanford University, undated). 377  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
1850, married couples began to limit the number of children they had by end- 
ing  their  childbearing  before  the  wife’s  menopause  occurred.  Married 
couples’  control  of  their  fertility  began  earliest  in the  northeastern  United 
States. Evidence of contraception within marriage sets the stage for analyzing 
the determinants  of a couple’s demand for children and for deciphering the 
connection between household  fertility decisions and the aggregate fertility 
decline.’ 
13.2  Explanations for the Decline in Fertility 
In a series of papers, Becker and others consider decisions about the num- 
ber and “quality” of children as jointly determined and interactive.8 Most em- 
pirical analyses of the quantity-quality model have focused on cross-sectional 
relations of fertility and wealth, yet the model is useful for examining fertility 
behavior  over time  as well.  Thus far,  the  testing  ground  for the  quantity- 
quality  model  has  been  twentieth-century  data.  McPherson’s comments- 
which echo the work of John Demos and Nancy Cott, among others-suggest 
that an investigation of nineteenth-century data might also prove fruitful  .9 
13.2.1 
The chief characteristic of the quantity-quality model is that the cost of an 
additional  child, holding  the  quality of  each  child  constant,  is  greater for 
higher-quality  children.  Similarly, the cost of increasing  the quality of  each 
child, holding the number of children constant, is greater for larger families. 
These interactions  imply that an  increase  in  wealth  would  initially  tend to 
increase the desired number of children and their quality, which in turn would 
raise the “prices” of each good and blunt the impact of the wealth increase. If 
the induced price effect exceeds the initial wealth effect on fertility, one might 
observe  a  negative  relationship  between  family  size  and  wealth  in  some 
wealth ranges.’O In Becker’s model and my own, the downward bias observed 
A General Description of the Quantity-Quality Model 
7. The lack of  evidence of  marital fertility control for pre-1850  families does not preclude 
viewing their decisions to have children as economic ones. The constraints on the supply of chil- 
dren caused by  early parental death could have been  binding,  for instance, so the demand for 
children coincided with (or fell short of) the available supply. 
8. Becker and Lewis, “On the Interaction between Quantity and Quality”; Becker and Tomes, 
“Child Endowments”; Gary Becker, A Treatise on the  Family  (Cambridge,  Mass., 1981); and 
Jenny Wahl, “Fertility in America: Historical Patterns and  Wealth Effects on the Quantity and 
Quality of Children” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1985), esp.chap. 3. 
9. John Demos, Past, Present, and Personal  (New York,  1986); Nancy Cott, The Bonds of 
Womanhood (New Haven, 1977). 
10. For primarily twentieth-century  results,  see Robert Michael,  “Dimensions of  Household 
Fertility: An Economic Analysis,” a paper given at the annual meeting of the American Statistical 
Association (New York,  1971); Warren Sanderson and Robert Willis, “Economic Models of  Fer- 
tility: Some Explanations and Implications,” Annual Report of  the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Robert Willis, “Economic Theory of  Fertility Behavior,” in 
Economics ofrhe Family, Theodore W.  Schultz, ed. (Chicago, 1974), pp. 25-75;  and Becker and 
Tomes, “Child Endowments.” 378  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
on the wealth effect approaches zero as wealth increases.  l1 One would there- 
fore expect to see a positive relation between fertility and wealth at the highest 
wealth levels. 
The  general  quantity-quality model  is  formulated  as  follows.  Children 
partly inherit their parents’ intrinsic ability (PABLTY), so O<c,<l  in equation 
(1). Although parents are assumed to know their children’s ability (CHABLTY), 
ability is not perfectly observable by an outsider, so an error term u  appears 
in equation (  1). 
(1)  CHABLTY = C, f CIPABLTY + U 
Parents derive pleasure from children and from the quality of their children. 
Parents’ demands for a particular number of children (PNUMKID) and for the 
quality  of  each  child  (measured  by  the  child’s  wealth  as  an  adult,  or 
11. Becker and Tomes in “Child Endowments,” pp. 5144-47,  formulate a child’s quality (mea- 
sured as child’s wealth, or CHWEALTH) as a linear function of the child’s ability  (CHABLTY) and 
parental contributions to the child’s wealth (PCONTRIB): 
CHWEALTH  = CHABLTY  + PCONTRIB 
As  a result,  the  elasticity of quality  associated with  parental  contributions (OBSELST)  exceeds 
the true quality elasticity (TRUELST) at lower levels of wealth, but the two converge as parental 
wealth  (PWEALTH) increases if  parental  contributions to their  children increase with  parental 
wealth. That is, 
OBSELST = (CHWEALTH~ONTRIB)  x  (TRUELST) >  TRUELST 
d(CHWEALTH/PCONTRIB)/dPWEAI.TH  = [(PCONTRIB - CHWEALTH)’(dPCONTRlB/dPWEALTH)]/ 
PCONTRIB2 < 0, if  (dPCONTRIB/dPWEALTH) > 0 
By the adding-up rule, the observed wealth elasticity of quantity is biased downward (and could 
be  negative) for  lower levels  of  parental  wealth; the  bias  becomes smaller as parental  wealth 
increases. 
My model presumes that parents contribute to children’s human capital and may leave bequests 
(BEQUEST) (Wahl, “Fertility in America,” pp. 65-66). Human-capital  investments interact with a 
child’s ability to generate the child’s lifetime earnings: 
CHWEALTH  = BEQUEST  + PCONTRIB’CHABLY! 
o<x< I;O<y<  I 
Parents  allocate expenditures on children so that the marginal  dollar spent on bequests and on 
human-capital investments yields the same increment to a child’s wealth. I assume that the mar- 
ginal return to human-capital investment exceeds l at low levels of investment and is less than  l 
at high levels. The marginal return to bequests is  1. As a result, parents of  low wealth leave no 
bequest  and the observed wealth  elasticity of  quality exceeds the true elasticity  of quality  by  a 
constant (I  ix) greater than 1. The observed wealth elasticity of  quantity could therefore be nega- 
tive in this wealth range. Where bequests exceed zero, an increase in parental wealth-with  no 
change in child’s ability-increases  bequests but leaves parental contributions to human capital 
unchanged. The observed quality elasticity therefore exceeds the true elasticity by a fraction that 
approaches zero as parental wealth increases if bequests increase with parental wealth: 
OBSELST = (CHWEALTHIBEQUEST)  x  (TRUELST) >  TRUELST 
BEQUEST? < 0, if  (~BEQUEST~~PWEALTH)  > 0. 
As in Becker and Tomes’s model, the adding-up rule implies that the observed wealth elasticity of 
quantity will approach the true elasticity as parental wealth increases. 
d(CHWEALTH/BEQUEST)/d  PWEALTH  = [(BEQUEST -  CHWEALTH)(aBEQUEST/aPWEALTH)]/ 379  The Decline in American Fertility in the  19th Century 
CHWEALTH) are thus functions of the exogenous variables, children’s ability 
(CHABLTY)  and parental  wealth  (PWEALTH). Equations (2) and (3) represent 
linear reduced-form demand equations for PNUMKID and CHWEALTH.  Higher- 
order wealth terms in equation (2) allow one to test for a varying observed 
relationship between fertility and wealth in different wealth ranges. 
(2)  PNUMKID = U,  + U,CHABLTY  + U,PWEALTH 
+ U3PWEALTH2  U4 PWEALTH3 
(3)  CHWEALTH  = b,  + b,CHABLTY  + 6,PWEALTH 
Because ability is not directly observable, empirical work must use proxies 
for children’s ability. Testable equations are obtained by lagging equations (2) 
and (3) and substituting in equation (1): 
(2’)  PNUMKID = a.  + C~GPNUMKID  + U,(PWEALTH  -  C,GPWEALTH) 
+ U,(PWEALTH, -  C,GPWEALTH~) 
-k  U,(PWEALTH3 -  C,GPWEALTH ’)  f E 
(3’)  CHWEALTH = p,  + (C, + b,)PWEALTH  - C,b,GPWEALTH  + p 
where a.  = a, (1 -  c,) + u,c,;  p ,  = b, (1 -  c,) + b,c,; E = u,u; p = bp; 
GPNUMKID = PNUMKID -,; and GPWEALTH  = PWEALTH-  ,. Equations (2’) 
and  (3’)  show  that  grandparental  wealth  (GPWEALTH)  and  fertility 
(GPNUMKID) serve as proxies for children’s ability. 
Because the interaction of the quantity and quality of  children implies that 
wealth  and  fertility  might  appear  negatively  related,  the  quantity-quality 
model makes no predictions on the signs of the wealth coefficients in equation 
(2’).  The model does, however,  generate coefficient restrictions.  The coeffi- 
cient on each grandparental wealth term equals the negative of the coefficient 
on the corresponding parental wealth term multiplied by that on GPNUMKID. 
Grandparental fertility has a positive coefficient, equaling the degree to which 
ability is inherited. 
The coefficients in equation (3’)  are also constrained by the quantity-quality 
model. The coefficient on PwEALTH  is positive, equaling the sum of two pos- 
itive  fractions:  (a) the degree to which  ability is inherited  and (b) parents’ 
propensity  to invest in  children’s wealth  out of  an  increment  in their  own 
wealth. The coefficient on GPWEALTH is negative, equaling the negative of the 
product of the two fractions. The absolute value of  the estimated coefficient 
on GPWEALTH in equation (3’) should therefore be smaller than the estimated 
coefficient on PWEALTH . 
Empirical  analyses of  the relation  between  fertility  and  parental  wealth 
often exclude grandparental  variables because  data are not  available.  How 
would this omission affect the coefficients on parental wealth in equation (2’)? 
Suppose that one’s ability interacts with parental contributions to one’s human 
capital to affect one’s wealth positively. Then wealth and ability are positively 
related within a generation and ability is positively related across generations, 380  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
implying that the covariance between CHABLTY and PWEALTH is likely to be 
positive. The bias from omitting grandparental variables (which stand in for 
CHABLTY) from equation (2’)  therefore depends on the sign of a,, the effect of 
CHABLTY on PNUMKID. 
Two effects influence the sign of a,. Greater ability lowers the cost to par- 
ents of  providing a given amount of  quality to each child, which would tend 
to increase PNUMKID and make a, positive. Greater ability also increases the 
productivity  of  investing  in children, however,  because ability and parental 
contributions  interact  to determine a child’s wealth. This tends  to increase 
quality, decrease PNUMKID, and make a, negative.  If a, is positive,  omitting 
the proxies for ability biases the true wealth effect upward. If a, is negative, 
the omission biases the wealth effect downward.  l2 
Omitting child’s ability from equation (3’) alters observed parental wealth 
effects  on  child  quality.  Becker  shows  that  excluding  the  ability  proxy 
(GPWEALTH)  from  equation  (3’)  biases  downward  the  coefficient  on 
PWEALTH. ” 
13.2.2  The Quantity-Quality  Model and the Nineteeth-Century American 
Family 
Economists  have  neglected  the  quantity-quality  model  as a depiction  of 
nineteenth-century  American  fertility,  partly  because  household  data  have 
been unavailable to test it. Additionally, many economists believe that nine- 
teenth-century  parents regarded their children as investment goods, begotten 
for their capacity to work on the family farm and to support their parents in 
old age.I4 Historians  and sociologists have been more amenable to the idea 
that children had non-pecuniary  value before this century; economic data ex- 
plored here corroborate this view. 
The quantity-quality model helps illuminate the decline in American fertil- 
ity through its focus on the prices of  quality and quantity and on the interac- 
tion of the two. The price of  quality fell through the nineteenth century be- 
12. If  CHABLTY  or proxies for it  are omitted from equation (2’), the expected value of each 
coefficient on a parental wealth variable equals the following: the true coefficient, plus the product 
of a, and the ratio of  the covariance of CHABLTY and the parental wealth variable to the variance 
of the parental wealth variable. In “Fertility in America,’’ I assume that one’s ability interacts with 
parents’ contributions to human capital to produce one’s wealth.  In the  linear model  used by 
Becker and Tomes in “Child Endowments”-where  a child’s ability is separate from human capi- 
tal investments made in him or her-an  increase in CHABLTY unambiguously causes the relative 
price  of quantity to  fall, thus increasing the  number of  children.  Because the  coefficient on 
CHABLTY is positive, omitting grandparents’ variables  would  bias observed  wealth  coefficients 
upward in their model. 
13. Becker, A Treatise, pp. 168-69. 
14. Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, “Did Rising Out-Migration Cause Fertility to Decline in 
Rural New England?’,  Working Papers on the History of Saving no. 5 (University of California, 
Apr. 1986); and William Sundstrom and Paul David, “Old-Age Security Motives, Labor Markets, 
and Farm Family Fertility in Antebellum America,” Explorations in Economic History, 25 (Apr. 
1988), pp. 164-97. 381  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
cause children  survived  longer and  public  schooling  became  increasingly 
available.  As Lawrence Stone notes, “very high  infant  and child mortality 
rates . . . made it folly to invest too much . . . in such ephemeral beings.”lS 
Better  public  health  procedures  in  the  latter half  of  the nineteenth  century 
reduced  infant and child mortality.I6 More attention to personal  cleanliness 
and improvements in water carriage and city planning,  for example, boosted 
the health  of  the population.”  At the same time, public  education  became 
more  prevalent  as  greater  population  density  reduced  costs  of  providing 
schools and as literacy generated  urban opportunities for many, particularly 
those who had little hope of ever owning a farm.Is While longer life spans 
raised the payoff from investing in children, cheaper access to schooling low- 
ered the cost.I9 These effects decreased  the price of  child quality,  inducing 
parents to substitute toward quality and away from the quantity of children. 
While the price of  quality  fell, the price of the quantity of  children rose 
through the nineteenth century. Several factors were responsible.  Historians, 
sociologists, and economists have commented on the separation of the home 
from the work place that accompanied the Industrial Revolution.20  Nancy Cott 
points  out  that  the  nineteenth  century heralded  the  separation of  job from 
15. Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage (New York,  1979), p.  82.  Stone was 
referring to emotional capital invested by  English parents in an earlier era; the reasoning is the 
same for American parents investing in a child’s human capital in  the first part of the  1800s. 
Clayne Pope, Robert Fogel,  and I trace the decline in mortality through the nineteenth century. 
See Clayne L. Pope, chap. 9 in this volume; Fogel, “Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality”; and 
Wahl, “Fertility in America.” 
16. See Daniel Scott Smith, “Differential Mortality in the United States Before 1900,” Journal 
of  Interdisciplinary History, 13 (Spring 1983), pp. 735-59. 
17. Richard Bushman and Claudia Bushman, “The Early History of Cleanliness in America,” 
Journal ofAmerican History, 74 (Mar. 1988), pp. 1213-38; Jon Peterson, “The Impact of Sanitary 
Reform upon American Urban Planning,  1840-1890,” Journal of  Social History,  13 (Fall 1979), 
pp, 83-104.  Harvey Levenstein suggests that the mid-1800s  signaled an end to the practice of 
feeding infants cows’ milk directly from the udder. (‘“Best for Babies’ or ‘Preventable Infanti- 
cide’? The Controversy over Artificial Feeding of  Infants in America,  1880-1920,”  Journal  of 
American History, 70 [June 19831, pp. 75-94). 
18. Robert Gallman reviews the relation between literacy and population density in a North 
Carolina county in “Changes in the Level of  Literacy in a New Community of Early America,” 
Journal of  Economic History, 48 (Sept. 1988), pp. 567-82.  Avery Guest and Stewart Tolnay, and 
Maris Vinovskis,  note the concomitant decline in fertility, rise in schooling, and move out of 
agriculture. See Avery Guest and Stewart Tolnay, “Urban Industrial Structure and Fertility, The 
Case of Large American Cities,” Journal of  Interdisciplinary History,  13 (Winter 1983), pp. 387- 
409; Maris Vinovskis, “Historical Perspectives on Rural Development and Human Fertility in 
Nineteenth Century America,” in Rural Development  and Human Fertility, Wayne Schutjer and 
C. Shannon Stokes, eds. (New York, 1984), pp. 77-96. 
19. Peter Lindert found that expenditures on public elementary and secondary schooling and on 
education in general for children aged 5 to 19 rose steadily from 1840 to 1930, with the sharpest 
increase taking place before 1900 (Fertility and Scarcity in America [Princeton, 19781). 
20. Claudia Goldin  surmises that the decline in women’s labor force participation with the 
advent of industrialization was caused in part by this separation, which removed the convenience 
and increased the costs of  being in the labor force, especially for women with  preadolescent 
children (“The Economic Status of Women in the Early Republic: Quantitative Methods,” Journal 
of  Inferdisciplinary History,  16 [Winter 19861, pp. 375-404). 382  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
home, man’s world from woman’s world: “To render home happy, is woman’s 
peculiar province; home is her world.”2’ Carl Degler maintains  that this di- 
chotomy gave women more control over household  decisions, including sex 
and reproduction; increasing domesticity went hand-in-hand  with the notion 
that the individual child was a precious commodity. Nancy Dye and Daniel 
Blake Smith note that mothers seemed more devoted to their children in the 
1800s; they illuminate the role of costs in decision-making and highlight the 
quantity-quality interaction. They believe that mothers had fewer children and 
emphasized  each child’s  quality  because  mothers  saw that  their  efforts  to 
nurture their children paid off  as babies increasingly survived infancy. Chil- 
dren  were  no  longer  trusted  to the  hands  of  God;  their  mothers’  capable 
hands could protect them.22  As  well  as watching  over their children more, 
nineteenth-century  women  spent more time in religious,  social, and educa- 
tional activities than their mothers and grandm~thers.~~  Additional  children 
detracted from the caliber of family life, the amount of time spent nurturing 
each child, and the time mothers could spend in other activities. As a result, 
the price of the quantity of children rose through the 1800s, inducing parents 
to have smaller families. 
Increasing real wealth  over time might also have generated lower fertility 
because  observed wealth  effects do not control for the  interaction  between 
quantity and quality. If the price effect dominated the true wealth  effect on 
quantity over some range of wealth, the desired number of children could have 
fallen  over  time  as observed  wealth  increased.  Alternatively,  decreasing 
wealth would imply lower fertility for families in the wealth range where fer- 
tility and wealth were positively related. The increasing dispersion of wealth 
in the nineteenth century therefore could have produced lower fertility if those 
getting richer and those getting poorer reduced their family sizes.24 
13.2.3 
The leading model proposed to explain the fertility decline in nineteenth- 
century America is that of Richard Ea~terlin.~~  He argues that the greater pop- 
An Alternative Model-Richard  Easterlin’s Target-Bequest Model 
21. Cott, The Bonds, p. 74. 
22. Carl Degler, Af  Odds: Women and the Family in Americafrom the Revolution to the Present 
(New York,  1980); Nancy Dye and Daniel Blake Smith, “Mother Love and Infant Death,  1750- 
1920,” Journal of  American History, 73 (September 1986). pp. 329-53.  Linda Pollock cites evi- 
dence that parents may have cherished children as early as the 1500s, while Philippe Ariks claims 
that the notion of childhood flowered during the seventeenth century. See Linda Pollock, Forgotten 
Children: Parent-Child Relations from 1500-1900 (New York, 1983); Philippe Aribs, Centuries 
of  Childhood (New York, 1962). 
23. For a discussion of the early history of women’s groups, see Anne Boylan, “Women in 
Groups: An Analysis of Women’s Benevolent Organizations in New York and Boston,” Journal of 
American History, 71 (Dec. 1984), pp. 497-523. 
24. In Fertility and Scarciry, Lindert notes the drift toward greater wealth inequality from 1770 
to 1860 and the high plateau of inequality from 1860 to 1929. 
25. Easterlin, “Population Change.” Other economic historians suggest that nineteenth-century 
children ensured old-age support for their parents. Ransom and Sutch, “Rising Out-Migration,” 
argue that American fertility might have fallen as children migrated westward and parents realized 383  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
ulation density in the Northeast in the 1800s led northeasterners to have fewer 
children than  frontier  families.  Like the quantity-quality  model,  Easterlin’s 
model suggests that, all else equal, more wealth would lead to higher fertility 
because children are a normal good. Easterlin surmises that another instinct 
motivated nineteenth-century parents: parents wanted their children to have as 
good a start in life as they had. The prospective increase in parental  wealth 
was the key factor indicating parents’ ability to provide their children with a 
proper start in life. The smaller the growth in wealth expected by parents, the 
fewer children they would have had. Because greater population density im- 
plied lower expected growth in wealth,  according to Easterlin, fertility was 
lower in the Northeast.  As population density increased  across the country, 
one might expect overall American fertility to fall. 
Easterlin’s  target-bequest  model  resembles  the quantity-quality  model  in 
important ways. Both view children as consumption goods that give parents 
non-monetary pleasures. Both shape parents’ utility as a function of not only 
children but also the children’s quality of life. Both conjecture that a couple’s 
fertility is related to their wealth and to the previous generation’s wealth and 
fertility.  Yet  the two models imply disparate empirical results  and  assign  a 
fundamentally different role to the grandparental variables. 
Because the variables each model emphasizes are the same, equations (2’) 
and (3’) can be used for Easterlin’s target-bequest model, as well as for the 
quantity-quality  one. The target-bequest  model  implies  a positive  parental 
wealth effect, a positive coefficient on GPNUMKID, and a negative grandparen- 
tal wealth effect in equation (2’).  The reasoning is as follows. Consider two 
couples having the same wealth, but different childhood living standards. The 
couple with the more prosperous childhood (greater GPWEALTH and smaller 
GPNUMKID, all else equal)  will have  fewer children  and give more to each 
child. The predictions on coefficient signs in equation (2’)  from the target- 
bequest  model  are therefore  more restrictive  than  those from the  quantity- 
quality model, which merely requires opposite signs on parental and grand- 
parental  wealth  variables.  Easterlin’s  framework  also  suggests  a  positive 
coefficient on GPWEALTH in equation (3’),  unlike the quantity-quality  model. 
The couple with  a more prosperous  childhood (greater  GPWEALTH, all else 
equal) would provide a better lifestyle for each child.26  According to Easter- 
that their children would increasingly default on “old-age security” payments. Sundstrom and 
David, “Old-Age Security Motives,” take a different tack. They speculate that better labor market 
conditions through the nineteenth century gave the young more bargaining power with their par- 
ents, which enabled youths to extract additional family wealth in exchange for providing old-age 
support to parents. As a result, couples began to have fewer children. The old-age security model 
is consistent with a panoply of signs on coefficients in equation (2‘) and is empirically indistin- 
guishable from the quantity-quality model. 
26. The strength of  this effect depends on the number of siblings in the family of origin. If 
grandparents of higher wealth had more children, the coefficient on GPWEALTH will be positive in 
equation (3’) as long  as  wealthier grandparents also provided higher living standards for each 384  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
lin, parents with greater wealth would tend to give more to their children as 
well.  Thus,  like the  quantity-quality  model,  Easterlin’s  implies  a  positive 
coefficient on PWEALTH in equation (3’). 
Grandparental  wealth and fertility  are causally related to the endogenous 
variables PNUMKID  and CHWEALTH in Easterlin’s model.  In contrast, grand- 
parental variables serve only as proxies for children’s ability in the quantity- 
quality model. 
As in the quantity-quality model, omission of grandparental variables from 
the target-bequest  model would bias the coefficients on parental wealth vari- 
ables  in  equations  (2‘) and  (3’). A  more  prosperous  childhood  (greater 
GPWEALTH  and  smaller GPNUMKID)  implies  greater  PWEALTH  and  smaller 
PNUMKID.  Omission of  grandparental  wealth  and  fertility  in  equation  (2’) 
would  thus  bias  downward  the  coefficients  on  parental  wealth  variables. 
Again,  this  prediction  is more restrictive  than  that  of  the  quantity-quality 
model, which allows either a positive or a negative bias. A more prosperous 
childhood for parents causes them to contribute more to CHWEALTH as well as 
increasing PWEALTH. Elimination of GPWEALTH in equation (3’)  would there- 
fore bias the coefficient on PWEALTH upward in Easterlin’s model, contrasting 
with the downward bias in the quantity-quality model. 
13.3  Empirical Analysis 
13.3.1  The Data Sample 
Fertility  data  for two consecutive  generations  of  households  and  wealth 
data for three consecutive  generations are needed to estimate equations (2’) 
and (3’).  The sample used here consists of sets of families connected by mar- 
riage  through several generations. Demographic  and socioeconomic charac- 
teristics are taken from a data source that links, on an individual basis,  ge- 
nealogical  records  to the decennial  federal manuscript census schedules for 
the years  1850 to 1880.27  Not only is the structure of the sample appropriate 
for estimating equations (2’) and (3’), it is also a unique, large, micro-level 
data set with longitudinal information antedating the twentieth century. 
Each sample observation has demographic and socioeconomic data for all 
individuals from three generations of  a single family. Genealogical  data in- 
clude each individual’s dates and places of birth, marriage, and death, and the 
total number of children born to the individual and his or her spouse. Census 
data include wealth, occupation, literacy,  school attendence,  relation to the 
child. Given Easterlin’s assumptions about wealth effects on fertility and on bequests, this is likely 
to be true. 
27. For a complete data description, see Jenny Bourne, Robert Fogel, Clayne Pope, and Larry 
Wimmer, “A Description and Analysis of the Data in the DAEiCPE Pilot Sample of Genealogies” 
(manuscript, University of Chicago, 1984);  and Fogel, “Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality.” 385  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
head of household,  and residence by  county, at the time of the census.  By 
assigning personal and marriage identification numbers to individuals, the in- 
dividuals are aggregated into families and families aggregated across genera- 
tions. Appendix A gives more detail on the process by which data were col- 
lected. 
Genealogies tend to be produced by relatively wealthy families, and aver- 
age wealth  is greater for this census  sample than  for other census samples 
collected. Households in my sample held an average of $4,184 in 1860 census 
wealth and $8,823 in 1870 census wealth. But household heads in this sample 
were also richer because they were older on average at the time of the census 
than those in other samples.**  Fortunately, a wide range of  wealth values are 
reported,  including  a  good  representation  of  families  with  no  reported 
wealth.29 
Several potential biases can be overcome by restricting the sample.30 Only 
families in which childbearing was complete when the genealogy was pub- 
lished are included. As a result, information about fertility for a sample family 
is incomplete only if records are incomplete, not because children were born 
after the genealogy’s  publication date. In addition, analysis concentrates on 
once-married couples who had at least one child and who were at risk to bear 
children until the mother was age 45.3’  These constraints buttress the notion 
that the number of children ever born is a good proxy for the number of chil- 
dren demanded in the observed families. Including only once-married couples 
generally ensures that each child recorded is matched to its natural mother and 
father.32  Omitting families with no children excludes couples in which at least 
28. Households in the Vedder and Gallaway 1860 Ohio census sample held average wealth of 
$2,900, and those in  Lee Soltow’s 1860 national sample held  $3,027. Households in Soltow’s 
1870 national sample held $3,035 on average, and those in the Hershberg and Dockhorn 1870 
Philadelphia sample held $3,257 on average. Soltow’s 1860 census sample of older men (aged 40 
to 99 years) held average wealth of $5,264, while his older-men 1870 sample averaged $5,323. 
See Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, “Migration in the Old Northwest,” in Essays in Nine- 
teenth Century Economic History: The Old Northwest, David Klingamen and Richard Vedder, 
eds. (Athens, Ohio, 1975); Lee Soltow, Men  and Wealth in the United Stares, 18.50-1870  (New 
Haven,  1975); Theodore Hershberg and Robert Dockhorn, “Occupation Classification,” Histori- 
cal Methods, 9 (Spring/Summer 1976). pp. 59-97. 
29. Soltow reports 38 percent of  his overall sample in each year with zero wealth; the sample 
used here has 5  1 percent of households with zero wealth for 1860 and 43 percent for 1870. 
30. Some sampling biases inherent in the sample remain in the constrained subsample. Geneal- 
ogies are produced by families with higher-than-average fertility and nuptiality and lower-than- 
average mortality  because  such families are more likely to have  a surviving heir compile the 
family’s history. Moreover, the regression sample consists solely of whites, with 98 percent of 
adults reporting themselves as literate. 
31. To ensure completed childbearing, only families in which the mother was born at least 45 
years before the publication date of  the genealogy are included. By age 45, secondary sterility sets 
in for most women. Couples in  which both partners survived to the mother’s forty-fifth birthday 
were assumed to be at risk to bear children up to that date. 
32. This constraint excludes stepchildren but not adopted children. Adopted children reflect 
parents’ inability to bear the children they want, which reinforces viewing the recorded number of 
children as a good proxy for the desired number. 386  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
one spouse suffered from primary ~terility.~)  Eliminating families in which one 
parent  died  before  the  mother  went  through  menopause  helps  ensure  that 
childbearing was not curtailed before couples had the family they desired.34 
Equations  (2’) and (3‘) are analyzed  separately  for families recorded  in 
1860 and for those recorded in  1 870.35  These results, contained in the follow- 
ing two sections, support the quantity-quality model. Equation (2’) is the fo- 
cal point of the analysis; equation (3’) further demonstrates the validity of the 
quantity-quality model. Table 13.1 reports descriptive  statistics for the vari- 
ables used in the regression analyses. 
13.3.2  Estimating the Fertility Equation (2’) 
The Unconstrained Model 
Table  13.2 compares coefficients and standard errors for two fertility  re- 
gressions using the number of children ever born as the dependent ~ariable.)~ 
33. Excluding no-child families cuts out couples who could have had children but chose not to. 
One would like to include such couples in  the regression,  but they are indistinguishable from 
primary-sterility couples. The percentage of families with no children in the sample (4 percent) is 
close to the estimated primary sterility rate for the period and slightly higher than the estimated 
twentieth-century rate of  1.7 percent.  See W.  Henry Mosley, “Reproductive Impairments in the 
United States, 1965-1982,” Demography, 22 (Aug. 1985), pp. 415-30.  If  one assumes that all 
childless couples suffered from primary sterility, the probability of a Type I1 error is small relative 
to the probability of  a Type I error. Therefore, all childless couples are excluded from the regres- 
sion analysis. I am grateful to Robert Fogel for this discussion. 
34. Did parents have  more children than they wanted? Available contraceptive methods cer- 
tainly were fallible, yet the sample exhibited fertility control within marriage. Modeling fertility 
as a choice variable is therefore consistent with empirical evidence. See Wahl, “Fertility in Amer- 
ica,” esp. table 6. For analyzing equation (2’),  the important question is whether knowledge of 
contraception was correlated with wealth; wealthier families may have been more aware of how 
to prevent having children. As a result, omitting contraceptive knowledge from equation (2’) 
could bias wealth coefficients downward because wealthy parents would have had relatively fewer 
children they did not want. John d’Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Marrers (New York, 
1988), pp. 59-64,  note, however, that accurate information about contraception began to circulate 
widely by the 1830s. 
Other excluded variables had little effect on the number of  children. Although mother’s age at 
marriage is omitted, women marrying later had significantly higher fertility rates within given age 
groups, indicating that fertility for these women might have caught up with fertility for younger 
brides. See Jenny Bourne, “Preliminary Analysis of Mortality and Fertility in the United States, 
1650-1899  (manuscript, University of Chicago, 1983). Although infant mortality is excluded, 
parents attempted to “replace” dead children by increasing their fertility rates, which suggests that 
the number of children ever born is closely related to the number of  surviving children. See Anne 
Williams, “Measuring the Impact of Child Mortality on Fertility: A Methodological Note,” De- 
mography, 14 (Nov. 1977) pp. 58 1-90;  and Bourne, “Preliminary Analysis.” Fecundity variables 
were not included, but studies indicate that only extreme malnutrition affects a woman’s ability to 
conceive. See Jane Menken, James Trussell, and Susan Watkins, “The Nutrition Fertility Link: 
An Evaluation of the Evidence,” Journal of Inferdisciplinary  Hisrory,  11 (Winter 1981), pp. 425- 
41. Adding these demographic variables to equation (2’)  reduces the variance of the disturbance 
term but does not substantially affect wealth coefficients. 
35. The 1850 and 1880 censuses are not used here because the former recorded only the value 
of real estate, while the latter recorded no wealth data. The 1860 and 1870 censuses recorded the 
values of both real estate and personal property. 
36. The next section reports results for a nonlinear regression. Alternatively, a Poisson model 
could be used. See Richard Steckel’s paper, chap. 12 in this volume. 387  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
Table 13.1  Descriptive Statistics for Regressions: The Linked Genealogy-Census 
Sample 
~~  ~ 
I860  1870 
Standard  Standard 
Mean  Deviation  %  Mean  Deviation  % 
Quantity of Children Regression, Equation 2’: Tables 13.2 and 13.3 
Parental variables 
Total children  5.6  3.0  5.1  2.0 
Wealth instrument  $6,753.0  $2,874.0  $10,088.0  $5,710.0 
Father’s age  44.0  14.0  42.0  14.0 
Total children  8.6  3.0  8.0  3.0 
Wealth instrument  $4,645.0  $2,741.0  $12,512.0  $6,322.0 
Grandfather’s age  76.0  14.0  74.0  15.0 
Grandparental variables 
Quality of Children Regression, Equation 3‘: Table 13.4 
Child’s wealth  $2,753.0  $1,943.0  $4,730  .O  $2,449.0 
Parents’ wealth  $6,547.0  $2,178.0  $8,185.0  $4,283.0 
Grandparents’ wealth  $7,653.0  $3,512.0  $10,363.0  $6,514.0 
Child’s age  31.0  5.0  34.0  4.0 
Grandfather’s age  87.0  6.0  87.0  6.0 
Father’s age  55.0  9.0  59.0  8.0 
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Table 13.2  Estimating Equation 2’: Number of Children Ever Born Regressed 
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Sources: Linked genealogy-census sample and Table 13B.  I 
aThe  F-statistic tests the significance of the omission of the intergenerational variables. Its degrees 
of freedom are (10,83) for the 1860 regression and (10,75) for the 1870 regression. 
The first regression includes grandparents’ fertility and instruments for paren- 
tal and grandparental wealth as independent variables, while the second omits 
grandparental  variable^.^' Appendix B discusses how the wealth instruments 
were obtained. 
37.  The standard errors for regressions that use instrumental variables are not exact. This is 
caused by the failure to control for the estimation error in the predictions derived from the first- 
stage regressions that create the instruments (Peter Schmidt, Econometrics [New York,  19761, p. 
160). Absence of direct measures of lifetime wealth precludes their inclusion in the regressions, 389  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
Fertility is positively  related  to parental wealth  for most  of  the sample’s 
wealth range. The relationship (displayed in Figure  13.1) is negative for the 
mid- to upper-wealth range, then turns positive at the highest estimated wealth 
levels.  The pattern  is congruent  with  the  interaction  between  quantity  and 
quality of children.38 It is not consistent with Easterlin’s model,  which sug- 
gests a uniformly positive relationship of fertility to wealth. Additionally, em- 
pirical  relationships  among  coefficients  approximate  the  quantity-quality 
model’s predictions. The coefficients on grandparental wealth terms are close 
to the negatives of the products of the coefficient on GPNUMKID and the respec- 
tive  coefficients  on parental  wealth  terms.  Only  the  coefficients  on  linear 
wealth terms are significant. 
Omission of the grandparental  variables  has significant consequences for 
observed wealth  effects on fertility. The omission biases the linear parental 
wealth term and increases its apparent ~ignificance.~~  The overall bias on the 
parental wealth effect is positive for the 1860 sample, though small. A posi- 
tive bias is consistent with the quantity-quality model but not with Easterlin’s 
model.  For the  1870 sample, the bias is positive  at most wealth  levels but 
negative  at  the  highest  levels  of  lifetime  wealth  estimated  for  the  sam- 
~le.~O  Omission of grandparental variables is significant at the 90 to 95 percent 
level. 
The Constrained Model 
The quantity-quality model implies several restrictions that were not incor- 
porated in the estimating procedure used in Table 13.2. The parameters of the 
constrained model are therefore estimated by  nonlinear least squares (Table 
13.3). If the constraints are appropriate, the estimated coefficients of the un- 
so true standard errors cannot be derived. Dummy variables for farm residence for both genera- 
tions were not significant. 
38. The positive relation at high wealth comports with the shrinking bias in the observed elas- 
ticities discussed in the text and in footnote 11. The initial positive relation coupled with the mid- 
range negative relation suggests that the interaction between quantity and quality was weak at low 
levels of  wealth and became stronger as wealth increased. 
39. The bias is expected in the quantity-quality model because the instrumental wealth variables 
are correlated with ability. The instruments are constructed in part from occupational variables, 
which are related to earnings; one would expect earnings to be correlated with ability (Wahl, 
“Fertility in America,” p. 55). Omission of the proxies for ability therefore biases the coefficients 
on wealth instruments. If instruments were constructed from variables uncorrelated with ability, 
the omission would affect standard errors but not coefficients (Schmidt, Econometrics, p. 40). 
40. One reason for the high-end negative bias within the framework of the quantity-quality 
model could be that the return to investing in human capital increasingly varied through time over 
families of different wealths. The most likely explanation is, however, that 1870 wealth variables 
are not as reliable as 1860 variables. The distortion to land markets caused by the 1862 Homestead 
Act and the wealth transfers caused by the emancipation of slaves imply that 1870 census wealth 
may not be as accurate a basis for lifetime-wealth estimation as 1860 census wealth. The sample 
drawn here from the 1870 census also may not be representative, as it recorded a higher average 
wealth than other collected census samples. 1860 
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Fig. 13.1 
Note: This figure represents the change in the quantity of children with respect to a change in 
parental wealth graphed against the level of parental  wealth in thousands of 1860 or 1870 
dollars. Line (1) graphs the change in quantity with respect to a change in parental wealth when 
the number of children ever born is regressed on parental wealth, grandparental wealth, and 
grandparental fertility. Line (2) graphs the same derivative when the number of children ever 
born is regressed only on parental wealth. Both are derived from Table 13.2. Line (3) is derived 
from Table 13.3 and represents the derivative from a regression of  the number of children ever 
born on parental wealth, grandparental wealth, and grandparental fertility, using the constraints 
on coefficients specified by the quantity-quality model. Min is the minimum wealth estimated 
for the sample, and max gives the maximum. 
Sources: Tables  13.2 and  13.3. 
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Table 13.3  Estimating Equation (2’)  with Quantity-Quality Coefficient 
Constraints: Number of Children Ever Born Regressed on Parental 
Wealth, Grandparental Wealth, and Grandparental Fertility 
1860  1870 
Independent  Asymptotic  Asymptotic 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Parental Wealth/103  0.179  0.325  0.016  0.058 
Parental Wealth2/10S  -0.980  2.111  0.086  0.068 
Parental Wealth3/10I3  0.815  2.580  0.002  0.026 
Grandparental fertility  0.025  0.098  0.113  0.075 
Number of observations  I04  96 
Chi-square test for con- 
strained versus uncon- 
strained model 
(4 degrees of freedom)  2.91  6.41 
Nore; The constraints of the quantity-quality model indicate that the coefficient on each grand- 
parental wealth variable (linear, quadratic,  and cubic) equals the negative of  the product of the 
coefficient on the corresponding  parental  wealth variable and  the coefficient on grandparental 
fertility. 
Sources: Linked genealogy-census sample and Table 13B.  1 
constrained model provide consistent initial estimates for the constrained pro- 
ced~re.~‘ 
Although the coefficients are not the same for the constrained and uncon- 
strained regressions, they are not significantly different. A chi-square test re- 
veals that the difference is significant only at the 40 percent level for the 1860 
sample and at the 80 percent level for the  1870 sample. As  in the uncon- 
strained regression, Figure 13.1 shows that wealth affects fertility positively 
for most of the relevant range of lifetime wealth, although the effect is nega- 
tive in the middle-wealth range for constrained regressions using 1860 wealth. 
In constrained regressions using 1870 wealth, the wealth effect appears posi- 
tive throughout. 
13.3.3 
Table 13.4 reports the estimation of equation (3’) to show that the coeffi- 
cients and the bias from omitting grandparental variables correspond to the 
quantity-quality model’s  prediction^.^^ In regressions including grandparental 
wealth, the coefficients accord with the quantity-quality model: the parental 
wealth coefficient is positive, and it is opposite in sign to and larger in absolute 
Estimating the Wealth Equation (3’) 
41. Various initial estimates result in unique coefficient estimates for 1860 data. For regressions 
using 1870 wealth, a second local optimum results if large starting values (0.45 to 0.75) are used 
to estimate the degree to which ability is inherited (coefficient c!). 
42. As in equation (2’). farm residence variables are not significant. 392  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
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Sources: Linked genealogy-census sample and Table 13B.  1 
magnitude than the grandparental  wealth coefficient. These results are incon- 
sistent with  Easterlin’s model,  which  predicts  positive coefficients  on  both 
wealth variables. 
Omission of grandparental  wealth has effects congruent with the quantity- 
quality model’s predictions.  The omission of GPWEALTH is significant at the 
70 percent level for both census years. Furthermore, the observed coefficient 
on PWEALTH in regressions that use three generations of wealth data is higher 
than the wealth coefficient found in many studies, including this one, that use 
only  The downward  bias on the PWEALTH coefficient caused by  the 
omission of  GPWEALTH is consistent with the quantity-quality model, but not 
with Easterlin’s model. 
43. For a review of two-generation studies, see Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes, “The Rise and 
Fall of Families,” Working Paper no. 84-10,  National Opinion Research Center (Chicago, Oct. 
1984). Two-generation studies using probate data find larger wealth effects. See Paul Menchik, 
“Inter-Generational Transmission of Inequality: An Empirical Study of Wealth Mobility,” Ecun- 
omica, 46 (Nov. 1979), pp. 349-62.  The size of  the wealth effect in probate samples may, how- 
ever, result from a selection bias. Many probate samples include only families in which fathers 
and sons made wills, and individuals who make wills are generally wealthy. Wealth is probably 
more highly correlated across generations for these families: a higher percentage of their wealth is 
bequeathed and bequests are not as variable as earnings. Michael Hurd and B. Gabriela Mundaca, 
for example, find that inherited wealth is  15 to 20 percent of wealthy individuals’ total wealth, 
and  gifts  are  5  to  10  percent. (“The  Importance  of  Gifts  and  Inheritances Among  the  Very 
Wealthy,” a paper given at the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in 
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13.4  Conclusion 
Many  scholars have  modeled  how  nineteenth-century  American families 
made life-cycle decisions, with an emphasis on explaining decreasing family 
sizes. Easterlin’s target-bequest model has been the most influential for eco- 
nomic historians, although old-age security models and various biological and 
sociological models  have  also been  proposed.  Explanations of  the fertility 
decline focus on household responses to macroeconomic phenomena, such as 
increasing  population  density  and  improving  labor markets  for  youth.  My 
work, like that of others, suggests that nineteenth-century household fertility 
decisions were influenced  by movements in macroeconomic variables.  Thus 
far, proposed fertility models have remained untested or have had to rely on 
imperfect, aggregate measures of fertility and wealth. Mine is the first to ex- 
amine and test a microeconomic fertility model using wealth and fertility data 
for three generations of families. 
The empirical analysis presented here indicates that the tradeoff between 
the  quantity  and  quality  of  children  offers  a  new  view  of  the  nineteenth- 
century American family and a promising explanation for the fertility decline 
through the 1800s. The quantity-quality model performs better on nineteenth- 
century household-level data than the leading alternative, Easterlin’s model. 
Coefficient signs comport with the predictions of the quantity-quality model; 
coefficient restrictions of  the quantity-quality  model are not rejected  at any 
conventional significance level; and the omission of grandparental variables 
from regressions is significant and biases parental wealth effects in the direc- 
tion predicted by the quantity-quality model. Neither coefficient signs nor ob- 
served biases from omitting grandparental variables harmonize with the pre- 
dictions of  Easterlin’s model. 
How does the quantity-quality model help account for the decline in nine- 
teenth-century American fertility? The model implies that fertility would have 
fallen  if the relative price of quantity rose,  either because the interaction  of 
quantity and quality affected the prices of the two goods when wealth changed 
or the  relative  price  itself  initially  increased.  Changes in  the  prices of  the 
quantity and quality of children  and in the degree of  dispersion of  wealth, 
rather than increasing average wealth or changing attitudes toward offspring, 
provide the key. 
Table 13.1 shows an increase in average lifetime wealth from the  1860 to 
the  1870 census.44 Figure  13.1 shows that this increment is in the range of 
wealth where fertility moved with wealth, so the growth in wealth would have 
tended  to  increase  rather  than  decrease  family  sizes.  The distribution  of 
wealth was, however, also more spread out for the sample in  1870-hinting 
44. This results partly from inflation: the Warren-Pearson price index reveals that prices over 
the decade rose by 45 percent. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the Unired 
States from Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, 1975). 394  Jenny Bourne Wahl 
that families, though wealthier on average, may have been in wealth ranges of 
lower  fertility.45  Greater  dispersion  of  wealth  implies that  some  families 
moved  into higher  wealth  ranges,  where  fertility decreased  as  wealth  in- 
creased,  while  some  moved  into lower wealth ranges,  where fertility de- 
creased as wealth decreased. 
Changes in the prices of quality and quantity furnish the most likely expla- 
nation for the fertility decline. The price of quality fell over time as lifespans 
increased and as public education became more available, causing investment 
in children to become more productive. The price of  quantity rose as home 
life became a separate entity, more children survived infancy, and women par- 
ticipated more in activities outside the home. Both effects increased the rela- 
tive price of quantity, encouraging nineteenth-century parents to have smaller 
families than their ancestors. 
Appendix A 
Creation of the Data Sample 
Step 1 
Each of nine genealogies is structured as follows. The first male immigrant 
to the United States with a recorded departure and destination place begins the 
genealogy. Within the genealogies, 25 percent of individuals were born in the 
period  1650-1799,  50 percent were born  in the period  1800-1849,  and 25 
percent  were born  in the period  1850-99.& A  family was  included  in the 
sample only if  the mother was born at least forty-five years before the publi- 
cation date.47  Publication dates include 1877 to 1970.48 
Step 2 
Each individual in the genealogies born between 1750 and 1880 was poten- 
tially matched to him- or herself in the federal census manuscript schedules 
45. Figure  13.1 demonstrates the relatively narrow band within which family size fluctuated. 
For instance, a $1,OOO  increment in a family’s 1860 lifetime wealth with all else constant would 
have increased the number of children by only half a child if initial family wealth were zero, and 
by only one-tenth a child if initial wealth were $1 ,OOO. The same increment would have decreased 
the number of children by only about one-twentieth if initial wealth were $30,000.  Although one 
might hope to observe larger wealth effects, these results are not terribly surprising-the  range of 
family sizes is small relative to the range of  wealth for the sample. 
46. The large proportion of the genealogical sample born  in  the nineteenth century means a 
high degree of potential matches with census data. 
47. By including only families in which the mother was born at least forty-five years before the 
publication date of  the genealogy, the sample includes only families that are observed for their 
entire potential childbearing years. 
48. Publication at a fairly recent date increases a genealogy’s legibility and accuracy relative to 
unpublished or pre-nineteenth-century genealogies. 395  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
for 1850 to 1880. Matching characteristics included name, age, region of res- 
idence, and knowledge of family structure. For successful matches, each per- 
son had both genealogical information (date and place of  birth, death, and 
marriage; number of  offspring; name of  and other information on  spouse; 
and identification numbers for own marriage and parents’ marriage if present) 
and census information (residence, occupation, literacy, school attendence, 
relationship to household head, and wealth). 
Step 3 
Individuals (each carrying the information described in step 2) were linked 
to their siblings through their parents’ marriage identification number, so that 
a single observation was formed for generation t  + 1. Two generations were 
then linked together by matching the parents’ marriage identification number 
for the generation t + 1 sibling group to the own-marriage identification num- 
ber for generation t individuals. A nuclear family observation with informa- 
tion on parents and children resulted from this step. 
0  Generation t (parents) 
llA\ 
000 00 
The genealogical file contains 16,820 individuals from 5,632 nuclear fam- 
ilies. Nuclear families at risk to be found in one of the censuses must have had 
at least one family member alive during the census year. The number of fami- 
lies at risk to be found in at least one census year is about 2,500; the number 
actually located is 2,042. The numbers of families found in each census year 
are 782 in 1850,649 in  1860,661  in 1870, and 706 in 1880. 
Generation t + 1 (children) 
Step 4 
Nuclear families were linked through marriage identification numbers to 
grandparents of generation t - 1. The parents’ marriage identification num- 
ber corresponding to generation f was matched to the own-maniage identifi- 
cation number for generation t - 1. The resultant observation constitutes all 
census and genealogical information on one generation t individual (and his 
or her spouse), on one or two generation t -  1 individuals (and their spouses), 
and on all generation 1 + 1 individuals (and their spouses) born to the gener- 




0  Generation t (parents) 
llA\ 
OOO  00 
Generation t - 1 (grandparents) 
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Appendix B 
Creation of the Wealth Instruments 
The estimation of equations (2’)  and (3‘)  uses instruments for all wealth vari- 
ables. Table  13B.1 shows coefficients and standard errors for the regression 
producing  the instrument for parental wealth.49  Census family wealth is  re- 
gressed on the age and age squared of  the father and on three dummy vari- 
ables: the occupation of the father, the family’s residence on a farm, and the 
family’s region  of  residence.  The age variables are included to account for 
life-cycle  effects  in  wealth  accumulation  and are  statistically  ~ignificant.~~ 
Other variables are included to correct for differences in earnings and wealth 
profiles and to act as proxies for the number and wealth of children. 
Instrumental  wealth  variables  are created  because  cross-sectional  wealth 
suffers as an  independent  measure  of  resources  available  to  “purchase”  the 
quantity and wealth of children. Parental wealth is directly related to the prod- 
uct  of  the  number of  children  born  and the amount already  spent on each 
(which influences children’s wealth) before the census date. Moreover, the use 
of cross-sectional wealth could generate a selection bias. Cross-sectional pa- 
rental wealth in families with deceased grandparents at the time of observation 
may  include a bequest, while cross-sectional  wealth in families with living 
grandparents  would  not.  If  most  sample families  had  living  grandparents 
when observed, grandparental wealth and fertility could serve as components 
of  lifetime  parental  wealth-that  is, bequests. A  regression  coefficient  on 
cross-sectional  parental  wealth  would  thus be biased.  The lack of  indepen- 
dence and the bias associated with cross-sectional wealth point to the need for 
an instrumental variable for lifetime parental ~ealth.~’ 
The use of wealth instruments is critical in evaluating wealth effects. Re- 
gressions using parental wealth instruments yield  very different results from 
those using cross-sectional  parental wealth. In contrast to the generally posi- 
tive relationship of fertility to estimated  lifetime parental wealth,  fertility is 
negatively  related to  cross-sectional  wealth  in all but the uppermost  wealth 
range. Coefficients on estimated  lifetime parental wealth are large compared 
with those  on cross-sectional  wealth, similar to results found by  others for 
49. Because parental  wealth squared and wealth cubed and grandparental wealth variables are 
included  in  the  fertility regression,  these variables  are  also instrumented (Wahl, “Fertility  in 
America”). 
50. Wealth increases to age 50.5 in the  1860 sample and to age 62.3 in the  1870 sample, and 
then falls, similar to the results of Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, “Egalitarianism, Inequality, 
and Age: The Rural North in  1860,” Journal of Economic History, 41 (Mar. 1981), pp. 85-93; 
and Soltow, Men  and Wealth. 
51. Another selection bias could arise if  cross-sectional grandparental wealth  were used as a 
proxy for their lifetime wealth. Families would be included in regressions only if the grandparents 
were living (and thus had not made a bequest) at the time of the observation. Because even an 
instrument for parental  wealth  controls imperfectly for bequests, cross-sectional  grandparental 
wealth could act as a proxy for a component of parental wealth. Therefore, an instrumental  vari- 
able for grandparental wealth is also necessary. 397  The Decline in American Fertility in the 19th Century 
Table 13B.1  Creation of Parental Wealth Instrument for Regressions of Equations 
(2’)  and (3’) 
Independent 
Variable 
1860  1870 
Standard  Standard 
Coefficient  Error  Coefficient  Error 
Father’s age 
Father’s age squared 
Nonfarm resident (dummy) 












Mid-  Atlantic 
North-Atlantic 
New England (omitted) 
Region of  residence (dummy) 
Mean wealth 
Number of observations 
Rl 
404  157 
-4  2 
2,596  1,937 
-4,369  2,362 
-  3,586  5,433 
1,771  2,643 
-  297  2,285 
119  1,983 
-471  1,884 
-  6,068  6,596 
-  122  1,220 
264  2,933 
3,563  13,393 
1,709  3,798 



































Source: Linked genealogy-census sample 
Note: The table gives coefficients and standard errors from a regression that creates the parental 
wealth instrument used  in regressions of equations (2‘)  and (3’). Similar regressions derive in- 
strumental variables for wealth squared and wealth cubed and for grandparental wealth variables. 
See Jenny Wahl, “Fertility in  America: Historical Patterns and Wealth Effects on the Quantity 
and Quality of Children” (Ph.D. dessertation, University of  Chicago, 1985). 
twentieth-century data.s2  Furthermore, coefficients on the estimated lifetime 
parental wealth linear terms are significant at the 95 percent level; coefficients 
on cross-sectional wealth are not ~ignificant.~~ 
52.  Bruce Gardner,  “Economics of  the Size of  North Carolina Rural Families,” Journal  of 
Political Economy, 81 (MarJApr. 1973), pp.  S99-122;  Dennis De Tray, “Child Quality and the 
Demand for Children,” Journal ofPolirical Economy, 81 (Mar./Apr. 1973). pp. S570-95;  Willis, 
“Economic Theory”; and Becker and Tomes, “Rise and Fall.” 
53. Instruments for grandparental wealth are equally important. Lifetime parental wealth had a 
positive effect on fertility throughout much of  the range, lifetime grandparental wealth a negative 
effect, and grandparental  fertility  a positive effect. In  contrast,  coefficients on cross-sectional 
grandparental wealth terms are of  the same sign as those on parental wealth terms, while the 
coefficient on grandparental fertility is negative. In estimating equation (3’). grandparental cross- 
sectional wealth suffers from the selection problem discussed in footnote 51: only families with 
grandparents  living at the time of  the observation are included.  Cross-sectional grandparental 
wealth serves partly as a measure of the bequest expected by  parents, so it is not surprising that 
the coefficients  on parental and grandparental wealth are both positive when cross-sectional grand- 
parental wealth is used. For all these results, see Wahl, “Fertility in America,” pp. 81-87. 